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Carolina Pereira Sáez, A Coruña / Spain1
 
 
Principlism: Bioethics as Procedure? 
 
Abstract: In their book Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress offer an 
account  of  bioethics,  called  “Principlism”,  by  way  of  specifying  and  balancing  four  clusters  of 
principles.
2 These principles are found, as the author state, in a common morality, understood as a set 
of universally shared moral beliefs.  
This paper seeks to introduce the following questions: Does this account of Beauchamp and 
Childress flow from common morality in a natural way? Can their proposals claim to be endorsed by 
the authority of common morality? If not, in what way does Principlism contribute to bioethics? 
Keywords: Bioethics, Principlism, Common Morality. 
 
I. What does Principlism propose? 
Principlism, or the Four-Principles approach to bioethics, is the particular school of bioethics 
developed by Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics.
3  Beauchamp and 
Childress claim that it is possible to identify four basic moral principles to be used as starting 
points for practical decision-making in biomedical hard cases.
4 
Principlism may be properly understood as an answer to the lack of consensus  among 
ethical perspectives that can be found in the United States of America since the middle of the 
twentieth century.  Considered as an answer, it offers to the perplexed practitioner the 
universality of its principles: 
  
“(1) Respect for autonomy (a norm of respecting and supporting autonomous decisions), (2) 
nonmaleficence (a norm of avoiding the causation of harm), (3) beneficence (a group of norms 
pertaining  to  relieving,  lessening,  or  preventing  harm  and  providing  benefits  and  balancing 
                                                           
 This piece is part of the ongoing research project “Principialismo y teoría de la argumentación en la toma de 
decisiones biomédicas” (DER 2010-17357/JURI) financed by the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación of Spain. It 
was presented as a paper in the XXV World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (Frankfurt am 
Main, August 2011). Orality has been preserved but footnotes have been added.  Some of the arguments 
expounded are provisional and all are open to discussion.  The author will thank any criticism. 
Acknowledgments: Pedro Serna (Universidade da Coruña, Spain), Richard Stith (Valparaiso University, Indiana, 
USA). 
2Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (6ª. ed.), Oxford University Press, 2009, 
25. 
3 Although Beauchamp and Childress are not the only supporters of Principlism and this book is not their only 
contribution to it, this article focuses on the sixth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics. On different 
accounts of bioethics based on principles, see Viviana García, PhD dissertation El consentimiento informado del 
paciente menor o incapaz, A Coruña, Universidade da Coruña, 2011, 62-72. 
4 See Beauchamp (note 2), 1-2.  
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benefits against risks and costs), and (4) justice (a group of fairly distributing benefits, risks and 
costs)”
5.  
 
These principles are put forward to express the general norms of common morality,
6 which, in 
its turn, is understood as the set of norms shared by all persons committed to morality.
7  They 
are suitable for solving hard biomedical cases among people who support different ethical 
theories.  So the relevant question seems to be this: How can these principles be universally 
accepted in conditions of deep ethical disagreement? 
From the principlist point of view, what we must do in order not to disturb this universal 
agreement  about  the  Four  Principles  is  to  let  aside  our  theoretical  inquiries  about  its 
foundations.  According to Beauchamp and Childress, the lack  of moral consensus is more a 
theoretical  than a practical  question:  “Convergence  as  well  as  consensus  about  principles 
among a group of persons is common in assessing cases and framing policies, even when 
deep theoretical differences divide the group”.
8  These theoretical differences do not prevent 
reaching similar practical conclusions, so, at the level of conflict-solving, it does not matter 
which understanding of the foundations of the principles we support: “Reasons exist […] for 
holding that […] distinctions among types of theory are not as significant for practical ethics 
as  some  seem  to  think”.
9  So  in  most  cases  ethical  differences  would  be  only  theoretical 
differences,  and  therefore  would  not  be  much  relevant:  to  solve  practical  biomedical 
questions, we can lay theories aside.  Indeed, even if a fully satisfactory general ethical theory 
were available, practical questions would remain largely unaffected by it.
10  
So far the principlist proposal may be summarized as follows: In order to face up to the 
lack of ethical consensus and yet solve practical biomedical questions, we must look for a 
common morality, general moral beliefs universally shared.  There we will find all the general 
norms we can expect to solve our bioethical dilemmas.  
Nevertheless the Four Principles, although expressing norms about right and wrong in 
human actions, do not suffice to solve all biomedical cases.  As a part of the common 
morality, principles are abstract, universal and content-thin norms, and “abstract norms do not 
contain enough specific information to provide direct and discerning guidance”.
11  The Four 
Principles  are only a spare starting point for the development  of more specific norms of 
conduct. For the purpose of addressing particular problems and contexts, they need to be 
                                                           
5 Beauchamp (note 2), 12-13. 
6 See Beauchamp (note 2), 12. 
7 See Beauchamp (note 2), 3. 
8 Beauchamp (note 2), 362. 
9 Beauchamp (note 2), 363. 
10 See Beauchamp (note 2), 1-2. 
11 Beauchamp (note 2), 9.  
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interpreted and implemented.  There is a further, two-fold feature of the Four Principles that 
explains their need of development: they are all equally binding but only prima facie.  No one 
is  a  supreme  moral  value,  overriding  all  other  conflicting  values.    So,  in  particular 
circumstances, all principles can be justifiably overridden by moral norms with which they 
conflict,
12 insofar as they create an equal or stronger obligation. In those cases, agents must 
locate “the greater balance” of right over wrong by comparing the weights of competing 
norms.  So as abstract and prima facie norms, principles have limits, limits that explain “the 
need to give them additional content”,
13 by way of specification and balancing. 
 
II. The common morality as the set of universally shared beliefs 
Before paying attention to the way Beauchamp and Childress, by means of specification and 
balance, propose to construct an applied ethics, we might focus on the following question: if 
the four clusters of principles, as  general  norms for biomedical  ethics,  are so  universally 
accepted, how do our ethical differences — even if only theoretical — occur?  Let us put it 
the other way round: Is it true, as Beauchamp and Childress state, that the Four Principles are 
universal, part of a common morality that “is applicable to all persons in all places, and we 
rightly judge all human conduct by its standards”?
14  From where does this common morality 
derive its authority?  
The authors do not attempt to justify the correctness or authority of the common morality.  
They just affirm, as a matter of fact, that some general norms are universally adhered to, but 
they realise that universal agreement does not render norms eo ipso authoritative.
15  In fact, 
they hold that common morality includes just moral beliefs, not objective standards prior to 
moral beliefs.
16  Beauchamp and Childress do not try to offer reasons why common morality 
is or should be universally accepted, but just depict the factual situation of some moral beliefs 
being shared by all persons committed to morality.  They just affirm that the norms of the 
common morality “have proven over time that their observance is essential for stability and 
civilized interaction”.
17  And it is precisely because we are already convinced about this that 
“the literature of ethics does not usually debate the merit or acceptability of these basic moral 
commitments”.
18  But this does not imply the claim that the moral norms of all societies are 
indistinguishable: only the most general and basic elements of morality are universally shared.  
                                                           
12 See Beauchamp (note 2), 14-15. 
13 Beauchamp (note 2), viii. 
14 Beauchamp (note 2), 3. 
15 See Beauchamp (note 2), 394. 
16 See Beauchamp (note 2), 4. 
17 Beauchamp (note 2), 394. 
18 Beauchamp (note 2), 3.  
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Moreover, “debates do occur about their precise meaning, scope, weight, and strength […]”.
19  
(This basic content of morality, precisely as universal, can also be found in most classical 
ethical theories).  To be applied, these basics elements of morality need to be developed and, 
interestingly, can be developed in many different and even mutually exclusive options.
20  In 
Beauchamp and Childress’ words, “[t]he reason why directives in particular moralities often 
differ is that abstract starting points in the common morality can be coherently specified in 
more than one way to create practical guidelines and procedures”.
21 
 
III. The authority of particular moralities 
Is every possible interpretation of the common morality justifiable, one wonders?  And, most 
interestingly, is its interpretation as offered in Principles of Biomedical Ethics authoritative?  
Does it benefit from the authority of its basic principles?  
To the latter question Beauchamp and Childress’s probable answer would be that they do 
not claim to have the authority of the common morality at every level of their account.
22  
Neither do they pretend their account to be universally accepted.  At the same time, they 
understand that their proposal can be considered a justified set of ethical beliefs relying “on 
the authority of the norms in the common morality”;
23 but this claim of derivative authority 
depends on the method they employ to develop the principles. 
Could,  then,  different  legitimate  interpretations  of  the  four  principles  be  developed?  
Beauchamp and Childress state that “different resolutions by specifications are often possible, 
and  nothing  in  our  method  can  ensure  that  only  one  specification  or  only  one  line  of 
specification will be justifiable.”
24  In fact, they insist on making clear what they understand 
as  a  frequent  mistake:  to  overlook  that  “even  the  firmest  rules  are  likely  to  encounter 
exceptive cases”.
25  In their opinion, lack of consideration of this less than absolute character 
of moral norms has produced “many stubbornly imperious pronouncements in biomedical 
ethics”.
26  We must bear in mind that  
 
“[d]ifferent parties may emphasize different principles or assign different weights to principles 
even when they agree on which principles are relevant. Such disagreement may persist even 
among morally committed persons who conform to all the demands that morality makes on them 
                                                           
19 Beauchamp (note 2), 3. 
20 See Beauchamp (note 2), 3. 
21Beauchamp (note 2), 6. 
22 See Beauchamp (note 2), 3-4. 
23Beauchamp (note 2), 387; see 386-388. 
24Beauchamp (note 2), 388. 
25Beauchamp (note 2), 19. 
26Beauchamp (note 2), 19.  
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[…].  We  cannot  hold  persons  to  a  higher  practical  standard  than  to  make  judgments 
conscientiously  in  light  of  the  relevant  norms  and  relevant  evidence.  […]  One  person’s 
conscientious assessment of his or her obligations may differ from another’s, even when they 
confront the same moral problem”.
27  
 
This  would  allow  for  a  variety  of  legitimate  specifications,  depending  on  cases  and 
circumstances, and would make Principlism get closer to casuistry: “Prima facie principles of 
the sort we accept are not vulnerable to the casuists’ critique and are not excluded by their 
methodology. The movement from principles to specified rules is similar to Jonsen’s account 
of  casuistical  method,  which  involves  tailoring  maxims  to  fit  a  case  through  progressive 
interactions with other relevant cases”.
28 
As  practitioners  we  may  ask,  nevertheless:  What  must  we  do  when  different  valid 
accounts  offer  mutually  exclusive  options  for  a  hard  biomedical  case?    Beauchamp  and 
Childress could answer that “various moral principles can and do conflict in the moral life.  
These  conflicts  sometimes  produce  irresolvable  moral  dilemmas”
29.    In  that  case,  neither 
option is morally preferable to the competing option.  And so it will make no moral difference 
which option we choose. 
Does this imply that every possible development of the Four Principles is justifiable?  If 
so, any bioethics would be a valid one, because, the Four Principles being universally shared, 
they would be starting point of all of them.  But the authors deny that those persons who 
accept particular moralities have the authoritative moral voice of common morality behind 
them.
30  Yet  experience  shows  that  even  those  “stubbornly  imperious  pronouncements” 
Beauchamp and Childress reject could probably be understood as interpretations of the Four 
Principles.  What logically follows is that, if not all interpretations of the Four Principles 
enjoy the force of common morality, how can we know which ones do?  Does not Principlism 
rest on answering this question?  If it cannot be answered, what does Principlism contribute to 
bioethics? 
 
IV. Two visions of Principlism 
At  this  point,  we  might  suggest  the  following  points  of  discussion:  If  Beauchamp  and 
Childress do not claim that their interpretation of the Four Principles is backed up by the 
authority  of  the  common  morality,  how  could  it  produce,  one  wonders,  any  substantial, 
decisive  contribution  to  bioethics?  If  they  profess  their  development  is  not  an  univocal 
                                                           
27Beauchamp (note 2), 25. 
28 Beauchamp (note 2), 381. 
29 Beauchamp (note 2), 12. 
30 See Beauchamp (note 2), 6.  
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interpretation of this common morality, their position would rather be but one among several 
possible legitimate proposals for solving hard biomedical cases. If so, to give it priority would 
amount to some kind of an ideological imperialism or trick, stating the universality of their 
interpretative account after merely alleging general agreement on their basic principles (unless 
they justify the universal validity of their method of interpreting those principles). 
If we take a look to the criticisms Principles of Biomedical Ethics have received, both the 
pluralistic and the univocal visions may be found. On the one hand, some critics say that the 
Four Principles are so pithless, so void of any substantial content that they “do not function as 
claimed […]. [They] are in fact no guides to action, but rather they are merely names of a 
collection  of  sometimes  superficially  related  matters  for  consideration  when  dealing  with 
moral problems”.
31 
Beauchamp and Childress would answer that the more the substance, the less likely the 
agreement: 
 
“attempts to bring the common morality into a more coherent unity through specification risk 
decreasing, rather than increasing, moral agreement in society. That is, a theory can introduce 
claims that generate disagreements not found in the initial considered judgments; or […it] may 
turn out to be less clear and reliable for practical decision making than the common morality in its 
elemental forms”.
32 
 
What we have, then, is mostly a conventional agreement: 
 
“To be sure, we have the four principles —autonomy, justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence 
—that we all agree upon.  We all think that autonomy is good, that justice is good, that it is good 
to do good, and that is good not to inflict harm. In short, by definition, we think that good is good.  
It is what constitutes the good in various circumstances that we cannot agree upon”.
33 
 
It seems, then, that what Principlism looks for is mostly an agreement rather than a set of 
rules for correctly solving hard biomedical cases.  It is sceptical of “a strong measure of unity 
and  systematic  connection  among  rules,  a  clear  pattern  of  justification,  and  a  practical 
decision procedure that flows from a theory”.
34 Principlism rejects the model consisting of 
applying principles to cases: “Often we have reason to trust our immediate responses of moral 
persons more than a theory, principle or rule. We also  have reason  to  trust  norms in  the 
common morality more than norms found in general theories. […G]eneral ethical theories 
                                                           
31 Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert, A Critique of Principlism, in: The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15, 
1990, 219. 
32 Beauchamp (note 2),  397. 
33 Tuija Takala, What is Wrong With Global Bioethics?, in: Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 10, 2001, 
73.  Needless to say, the emptiness alleged by Takala would make superfluous the objection of imperialism. 
34Beauchamp (note 2), 397.  
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should  not  be  expected  to  yield  concrete  rules  or  judgments  capable  of  resolving  all 
contingent moral conflicts”.
35 
To some academics, then, the Four Principles are not much more than common words too 
vague and insufficient to ground a global Ethics upon.
36  But Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
is an implementation, by way of specification and balancing, of the Four Principles, and what 
Beauchamp and Childress propose is basically a method to reduce indetermination and face 
hard cases.  Is this a sufficient reason to believe that Principlism offers a real, workable, 
global bioethics?  
The view of Principlism as seeking to offer a global bioethics underlies a second kind of 
critiques.  Several writers deny the starting point of Principlism, i.e., the conviction that the 
Four  Principles  are  universal:  “The  Georgetown  principles  do  not  hold  the  monopoly  in 
health-care ethics”.
37  What these authors really intend to deny is not the universal truth that 
good is good.  They rather doubt that the account of the Four Principles that Principlism 
proposes is a universal one.  They reject the principlist interpretation of the good, and the way 
we can know it and try to respect it in our behaviour.  Beauchamp and Childress suggest 
putting these questions aside, since they are but a part of ethical theories.  Yet, their own 
account of bioethics suggests that they are indispensable and that a general agreement on 
them is far from being taken for granted.  
To  better  appreciate  the  rational  strength  of  these  criticisms,  we  could  consider  the 
method of coherence, the specification and balancing procedure that the authors propose as an 
appropriate  development  of  the  common  morality.
38  This method has been criticised as 
intuitionism, and this might be not a completely misleading critique, given the proximity 
between Principlism and Casuistry that Beauchamp and Childress affirm.  But maybe there is 
no need to further analyse their meth od, because we have their answer ready at hand: 
Beauchamp and Childress do not pretend to carry the common morality authority to every 
level of their account: “ […A]ltough specifications and adjustments of moral beliefs beyond 
the  common  morality  should  be  guided  by  considerations  of  overall  coherence,  such 
considerations will not always pick out a unique set of moral beliefs as most justified”.
39 
                                                           
35Beauchamp ((note 2), 397. 
36 See Takala (note 33), 73. 
37 Matti Häyry, European Values in Bioethics: Why, What and How to be Used?, in:  Theoretical Medicine 24, 2003 
208. See, also, Takala, (note 33) passim; Anthony Fisher, Is Bioethics an American Plot?, in: 
www.mercatornet.com, 04-12-2009, passim; Søren Holm, Not Just Autonomy. The Principles of American 
Biomedical Ethics, in: Journal of Medical Ethics 21, 1995, 332-338; Edwin R. DuBose, Ronald P. Hamel and 
Laurence J. O’Connell (eds.), A Matter of Principles? Ferment in U.S. Bioethics, Trinity Press International, 1994, 
passim.  
38 See Beauchmp (note 2), 385. 
39Beauchamp (note 2), 388.  
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There  could  be  one  vision  of  Principlism  left:  Could  it  be  that  the  imperialism  that 
Principlism has been accused of consists just of that kind of emptiness it asserts of common 
morality? If a so thin-content morality is our last authoritative guide, we have no substantive 
direction to our hard cases; and we could not expect it. Bioethics could be no much more than 
a procedure. As Campbell states, 
 
“The principlist response to pluralism characteristically has been to stress the moral significance 
of shared procedures at the risk of adopting a stance of metaphysical neutrality or agnosticism 
about the nature of the good life.  We can, on the principlist account, be “friendly strangers” […], 
because of a shared commitment to procedural values of moral reasoning and accountability, as 
well as to institutional procedures that express convictions about the equality of persons, and the 
presence of a general trust that others will respect the common principles and rules of the moral 
life. The public affirmation of a substantive position rooted in a particular vision of human nature 
and destiny may, by contrast, risk divisiveness and disruption, a moral babel that threatens to 
subvert the moral reliance on publicly accessible reasons espoused by principlism”.
40 
 
V. By way of a conclusion 
Beauchamp and Childress no doubt deserve much praise for trying to give a universal guide 
for practitioners of bioethics worldwide.  The intent to rely on a common morality is to be 
equally praised.  Yet several serious problems arise.  Let us just summarise but a handful of 
them. 
First,  the  “American  Plot”  criticism  has  been  but  mentioned  in  this  article.    To  a 
European mind this may seem clear, but possibly many an American would remind us that 
there are always two views.  As a literal phrase, “the American Plot” is an exaggeration but its 
merits should not be dismissed without further consideration.  Perhaps the right answer goes 
along the lines  of the unawares,  maybe  even  reluctant,  “imperialism” (sic) typical  of the 
Anglo Saxons: not imposing but taking for granted that our vision of life, death, pain, love, 
happiness, and interpersonal relations, is the natural vision of everybody (a bit like speaking 
louder  to  foreign  people  when  they  do  not  understand  English,  instead  of  trying  their 
language).  No doubt the globalisation brought about by the Roman Empire was at the same 
time a process of Romanization — intended or not, imposed or longed for, it is quite another 
question.  Is it too bold to think that several of our present day cultural and ethical discussions 
were originally Anglo American and Northern European agendas?  The fact that this is often 
due to imitation rather than to imposition tells us much about the spontaneous strength of 
Anglo Saxon culture but do not change things.  
Beauchamp and Childress can claim that their Principlism significantly contributes to 
solve our hard biomedical cases only if it is a univocal and universal interpretation of the 
                                                           
40 Courtney S. Campbell, Principlism and Religion: The Law and the Prophets, in: DuBose (note 37), 185.  
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common morality.  If not, it will not really help us too much to face up to the lack of ethical 
consensus at the practical, conflict-solving level.  Spaniards, Latin Americans or Africans may 
happen to have a different approach to death, pain, family or happiness — indeed they do, as 
every  casual  visitor  to  Latin  America  has  seen.    Or  perhaps  they  have  preserved  their 
traditional agreement on fundamentals to a degree higher than Americans and Europeans.  Or 
may be they still think in terms of human nature, substance and accident — and who could 
say they should stop doing so and change to Beauchamp and Childress reasoning?  If they still 
share  a  good  deal  of  basic  agreement,  why  should  they  go  for  a  minimal,  procedural 
agreement,  perhaps  crafted  in  another  society?  Why  to  look  for  a  common  minimal 
denominator if they still have a common maximal or medium denominator?  What if instead 
or Beauchamp and Childress we ask Guatemalans or Salvadoreans to write a bioethical code 
according to their cultures, and then expand it to the whole Planet? 
Second, the risk of becoming a new kind of excluding monism cannot be disregarded.  
All points of view are admitted, no fundamental agreement is needed, we are told; but those 
claiming a substantial position on some contested, difficult topics, could be de facto denied a 
chance of being considered on equal footing as all the rest.  Principlism could thus result a 
monistic account of common morality insofar as it denies any possibility of a correct or better 
interpretation of it.  Any interpretation that means to exclude any other interpretation must 
itself be excluded: we must accept even contrary accounts of the principles. 
Given the limitations of this paper, we can but advance some other problems not duly 
dealt with in it: First, the risk of fostering a narrow positivism.  Since fragmentation and 
excessive pluralism bring about a situation of near anomie — no one can address his or her 
fellow citizen in a language cogent for all —, people tend to take shelter in the narrow-
minded, short-sighted positivism of the written norms and regulations actually in force, no 
matter how ungrounded, ill framed, irrelevant or ephemeral they may happen to be.  Second, 
the common morality criticisms: What if a common morality no longer exists, or simply is 
hard to discern?  Can it be substituted by an artificial, ephemeral agreement, as if we were 
writing the rules for a Western club — and then impose them to the rest of the World?  The 
terrorism threat, the weakness of civil society, and the close connections governments have 
with the media, all put together, bring about the fact that policing people’s minds, or changing 
the mentality of a society becomes a (relatively) feasible task.  Not to mention the possibility 
that our common morality could come to depend, in the end, on the entertainment industry. 
But of this later. 
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